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Abstract 
Conspiracy beliefs are widespread and can have detrimental consequences. 
As perceived social norms can exert a powerful influence on individuals, we 
investigated the relationship between perceived norms of conspiracy beliefs and 
personal endorsement and whether conspiracy belief amongst others is 
overestimated. In Study 1, UK university students (n = 111) completed measures of 
their personal conspiracy beliefs and estimations of others’ beliefs (an in-group and 
out-group they chose, and a prescribed in-group). The perceived belief of the in-
groups strongly predicted personal conspiracy belief; the out-group did not. Study 2 
and 3 replicated these findings in a British community sample (n = 177) and a UK 
parent sample (n = 197) focusing on anti-vaccine conspiracy theories. All studies 
demonstrated that people overestimate the conspiracy beliefs of others. This is the 
first demonstration of the association between perceived social norms of in-group 
conspiracy belief and individuals’ personal conspiracy beliefs. Interventions 
challenging misperceived norms could be effective in reducing conspiracy beliefs. 
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“If they believe, then so shall I”: Perceived beliefs of the in-group predict 
conspiracy theory belief 
1. Introduction  
Conspiracy theories can be defined as explanations for important events that 
involve secret plots from powerful malevolent groups (Douglas et al., 2019). 
Commonly endorsed conspiracy theories argue that climate change is a hoax (Jolley 
& Douglas, 2014a; Lewandowsky, Oberauer, & Gignac, 2013), the moon landings 
were faked by NASA (Lewandowsky et al., 2013) and that vaccinations are harmful, 
but this fact is covered up to maintain profits (Jolley & Douglas, 2014b). Although by 
definition conspiracy theories are alternative explanations, they are widespread 
(Oliver & Wood, 2014) and research suggests that belief in one conspiracy theory is 
strongly related to believing in several others (Goerztel, 1994; Wood, Douglas, & 
Sutton, 2012). British polls have found that one in four believe that the threat of 
climate change is exaggerated, one in six believe that the moon landings were 
staged, and one in five believe that vaccines have harmful effects which are being 
kept secret (YouGov, 2019). The current paper investigates a potential new 
antecedent to conspiracy belief - the perceived belief of others we identify with – 
where across three different contexts, we examine the relationship between 
perceived norms of conspiracy belief and actual beliefs.  
1.1 The Psychology of Conspiracy Theories 
There is a growing body of research demonstrating that belief in conspiracy 
theories can lead to harmful consequences (see Jolley, Mari & Douglas, 2020). In 
the health domain, endorsement of conspiracy beliefs about birth control (e.g., the 
belief that birth control is primarily to reduce Black populations) has been found to 
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predict negative attitudes towards contraceptives (Thorburn & Bogart, 2005). Belief 
in conspiracy theories also reduces intentions to vaccinate children against common 
childhood diseases (Jolley & Douglas, 2014b). In the social domain, exposure to 
conspiracy theories regarding climate change reduces pro-environmental intentions 
and political engagement (Jolley & Douglas, 2014a). Jolley, Meleady and Douglas 
(2019), have illustrated how exposure to intergroup conspiracy theories amplifies 
prejudice towards the target group (i.e., immigrants, Jewish people). Endorsing 
conspiracy theories can have detrimental consequences across a range of 
behaviours.  
Given that millions of people subscribe to these potentially harmful viewpoints 
(Sunstein & Vermeule, 2009), there needs to be a better understanding of the 
psychological mechanisms underlying why people believe in conspiracy theories. 
Research to date has suggested that personality traits such as narcissism 
(Cichocka, Marchlewska & Golec de Zavala, 2016), Machiavellianism (Douglas & 
Sutton, 2011; March & Springer, 2019), and subclinical paranoid and schizotypal 
personality traits (Barron, Furnham, Weis, Morgan, Towell & Swami, 2018; Darwin, 
Neave, & Holmes, 2011; March & Springer, 2019), are related to conspiracy beliefs. 
Other psychological factors have also been shown to predict belief in conspiracy 
theories, such as distrust in authority, higher political cynicism, lower self-esteem, 
Need for Uniqueness and heightened stress (Abalakina-Paap, Stephan, Craig, & 
Gregory, 1999; Imhoff & Lamberty, 2017; Lantian, Mullerm, Nurra & Douglas, 2017; 
Swami et al., 2016). The current research aims to contribute to the literature by 
identifying a potential new antecedent to conspiracy belief, perceived social norms 
regarding belief, and suggests potential new avenues to address the dangers of 
heightened conspiracy belief. 
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1.2 Social Norms 
Social influence refers to how our beliefs and behaviours are determined by 
perceptions of what other people think and do (Cialdini & Trost, 1998). A major 
component of social influence is social norms. Sherif (1936) describes social norms 
as jointly negotiated rules for social behaviour. Social norms guide one’s behaviour 
by implicitly outlining what is acceptable and what is not in particular contexts 
(Cialdini & Trost, 1998).  Social norms are often subcategorised into descriptive and 
injunctive norms. Descriptive norms refer to the perceived prevalence of an attitude 
or behaviour (i.e., ‘‘what others do’’), and injunctive norms refer to the perceived 
attitudes toward the behaviour (i.e., ‘‘what others approve or disapprove of’’) 
(Cialdini, Reno & Kallgren, 1990). Perceived social norms are a major determinant of 
attitudes and behaviour across diverse domains, for example; substance use 
(LaBrie, Hummer, Neighbors, & Pedersen, 2008; Neighbors, Larimer, & Lewis, 2004; 
Walters, Bennett, & Noto, 2000), gambling (Larimer & Neighbors, 2003), infection 
control (Dickie, Rasmussen, Cain, Williams, & MacKay, 2018), and green behaviours 
(Anderson et al., 2017). The current study focuses on descriptive norms of 
conspiracy belief, as these are used most often in the first instance of exploring the 
link between perceived norms and personal attitudes and behaviours (Dempsey, 
McAlaney & Bewick, 2018).  
The theoretical basis for the exploration of the association between perceived 
social norms of conspiracy beliefs and personal beliefs is rooted in Social Identity 
Theory (SIT) (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). SIT states that individuals look to other 
members of the group to guide their attitudes and behaviour; meaning, people’s 
attitudes and behaviour are systematically influenced by the norms of groups to 
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which they belong (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner, 1982; 1991). People who more 
strongly identify with the group are more likely to act in accordance with the group 
norms (Terry & Hogg, 1996). For example, Neighbors et al. (2010) studied college 
student drinking norms and demonstrated that higher identification with other 
students was associated with stronger relationships between perceived student 
drinking norms and personal drinking. Thus, perceived norms of conspiracy belief 
may influence personal belief in conspiracy theories, particularly if we perceive 
groups who we strongly identify with endorse conspiracy theories (Terry & Hogg, 
1996).   
1.3 Social Norms and Conspiracy Belief 
In accordance with this train of thought, core aspects of SIT have been 
demonstrated to influence belief in specific conspiracy theories. Research shows 
that in the context of situational threats, individuals who highly identify with an in-
group are motivated to endorse conspiracy theories against the out-group. For 
example, Mashuri and Zaduqisti (2013) and Chayinska and Minescu (2018) found 
that in the context of intergroup conflict, strong identification with the in-group 
(Muslims and Euromaiden supporters respectively) increased endorsement of 
conspiracy theories related to the out-group. Further, research has robustly 
demonstrated that acceptance of conspiracy theories in intergroup contexts is 
associated with a defensive identification with in-group (Cichocka, Golec de Zavala, 
Marchlewska & Olechowski, 2015; Cichocka, Marchlewska, Golec de Zavala, & 
Olechowski, 2015; Marchlewska, Cichocka, Łozowski, Górska, & Winiewski, 2019). 
Specifically, collective narcissism, a form of defensive in-group positivity, reflecting a 
belief in the in-group’s greatness which is unfairly unappreciated by others, predicts 
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belief in out-group conspiracies (Cichocka et al., 2015). SIT states that to maintain a 
positive social identity, one seeks to distinguish the in-group from the out-group in 
such a way that favours the in-group (Reicher, Spears & Haslam, 2010). Thus, 
stronger identification with the in-group influences motivation to endorse conspiracy 
theories against the out-group, particularly when the positive image of the in-group is 
threatened. 
Douglas and Sutton (2008) demonstrated that exposure to conspiracy 
theories increases belief in them, which has been the foundation of subsequent 
research (e.g., Jolley & Douglas, 2014a, 2014b; Swami et al., 2011). Group 
memberships can influence the types of conspiracy theories individuals are exposed 
to. For example, in the US, members of different political parties can recognise which 
parties have ‘ownership’ of different conspiracy theories (Smallpage, Enders, & 
Uscinski, 2017). Both Republicans and Democrats agreed that conspiracy theories 
regarding Obama’s birthplace were more likely to be promoted by Republicans than 
by Democrats (Smallpage et al., 2017). This could increase the individual’s belief in 
these conspiracy theories as well as their perception that other group members also 
endorse them, leading to misperceptions of how widespread conspiracy theories are. 
Specifically, if individuals perceive that the groups they identify with endorse 
conspiracy theories, and thus normative influence is maximised, this could drive 
personal endorsement of conspiracy theories.  
1.4 The Current Research 
The current studies aim to investigate the association between perceived 
norms of in-group conspiracy belief and personal conspiracy endorsement of a range 
of issues (such as climate change, the moon landings and the existence of aliens), 
and whether people over-estimate the belief of others in these conspiracy theories. 
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Studies 1 and 2 examine the relationship between participants’ predictions of the 
belief of three social groups in conspiracy theories (i) an in-group chosen by 
participants; (ii) an out-group chosen by participants; and (iii) a prescribed in-group, 
‘typical students’ (Study 1) and ‘other British citizens’ (Study 2) and their personal 
belief in the same conspiracy theories. The in-group chosen by the participant 
represents a proximal group, as research has shown that proximal groups exert 
more influence on individual beliefs and behaviour (e.g. Neighbors et al., 2010), 
whereas the prescribed in-groups represent broader in-groups. It is hypothesised 
that the perceived norms regarding conspiracy belief of both the in-group chosen by 
participants and the prescribed in-group will positively predict personal belief in 
conspiracy theories. However, the perceived norms of the out-group regarding 
conspiracy belief will not. It is also hypothesised that participants will over-estimate 
the extent to which other students at the same university (Study 1) and other British 
citizens (Study 2) endorse conspiracy theories. 
Study 3 then focusses on a specific conspiracy theory (anti-vaccine 
conspiracy theories) with a specific in-group (parents). Although vaccines are the 
most effective way to prevent infectious diseases (NHS, 2019), their safety and 
efficacy have long been embroiled in conspiracy theories, centring on the arguments 
that big pharma companies and/or governments cover-up information about vaccines 
for their own personal gains (Jolley & Douglas, 2014b; Kata, 2010). Belief in anti-
vaccine conspiracy theories has been shown to reduce vaccination intentions 
(Hornsey, Harris & Fielding, 2018; Jolley & Douglas, 2014b). As the uptake of 
childhood vaccines is decreasing in many countries (e.g. in the UK) (WHO, 2019; 
NHS, 2019), it is particularly important to investigate the antecedents of anti-vaccine 
conspiracy beliefs. It is hypothesised that (i) the perceived beliefs of two different in-
CONSPIRACY THEORIES AND BELIEF OF THE IN-GROUP 
 
groups, other parents and other British citizens, in anti-vaccine conspiracy theories 
will positively predict personal belief in them and (ii) that parents will over-estimate 
the level of belief in anti-vaccine conspiracy theories of other UK parents.   
Need for Uniqueness and identification with each of the social groups was 
also measured in each study. Previous research has shown that conspiracy theories 
are attractive as they can bolster one’s need to feel unique (Imhoff & Lamberty, 
2017; Lantian et al., 2017), and those who are high in uniqueness are less likely to 
be influenced by perceived social norms (Imhoff & Erb, 2009). Thus, it was 
hypothesised that the relationship between perceived norms of conspiracy belief and 
actual norms will be moderated by i) Need for Uniqueness, such that, the stronger 
participants need to feel unique, the less influence the perceived norms would have 
on actual conspiracy belief, and ii) level of social identification with the group, such 
that the stronger participants identify with a group, the stronger the association 
between perceived norms of conspiracy belief and actual beliefs. All materials for 
Study 1 can be found here: https://osf.io/2p9ez/, materials and data for Study 2 can 
be found here: https://osf.io/4786a/ and materials and data for Study 3 can be 
viewed here: https://osf.io/9q5kt/. 
 
2. Study 1 
2.1 Method 
2.1.1 Participants and Design 
As no previous studies had assessed the relationship between perceived 
norms of conspiracy belief and actual norms, there were no clear expectations of 
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effect size. Power analysis using GPower showed that to detect a medium effect 
using Cohen’s f2 (f2 = .15), a sample of n = 115 participants would be required for 
85% power for regression analysis (linear multiple regression: fixed model, R2 
deviation from 0) with seven predictor variables. One hundred and eighty-one 
students studying at a UK university were recruited to take part in the study in return 
for course credit. The questionnaire included attention check items (e.g. ‘Check 4 for 
this statement’); participants who failed an attention check (n = 48), and participants 
who failed to enter a sensical in-group and out-group (n = 22), were removed (total n 
= 70). The remaining participants (N = 111; 97 females, 14 males, M = 23.32 years, 
SD = 7.81) were included in the analysis.  
The study employed a cross-sectional design, where the outcome variable 
was the participant’s belief in conspiracy theories. The predictor variables were the 
perceived conspiracy beliefs of an in-group (chosen by participants), an out-group 
(also chosen by participants) and ‘typical (name of university) students’. Participants’ 
Need for Uniqueness and social identification with each of the groups were 
measured as moderator variables2. Demographic variables, sex and age, were also 
measured.  
2.1.2 Materials and Procedure  
Ethical approval was first gained from the relevant university ethics panel. The 
study was hosted by Qualtrics, an online software tool used to build questionnaires. 
Once the study was accessed, participants were first presented with an information 
 
2 In both studies 1 and 2 general conspiratorial mindset of participants was also measured using the 
Generic Conspiracist Beliefs Scale (Brotherton, French & Pickering, 2013). This was initially 
considered as a potential moderator variable, however, this is highly correlated with the Belief in Real-
World Conspiracy Theory Scale (Study 1 = .66**) and (Study 2 = .71**), this variable was not 
analysed any further.  
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page, followed by a consent form. First participants were asked to complete some 
demographic questions, and then they were asked to state an in-group of their 
choice; ‘We are often part of many different groups, some of these we feel close to 
and identify with, and some of these we may not feel as close to, or may not identify 
with. Please indicate below a group who you feel close to and strongly identify 
with...’. Participants were then asked to state an out-group; ‘Please indicate below a 
group who you do not feel close to and do not identify with...’.  
Personal belief in conspiracies was measured using the Belief in Real-World 
Conspiracy Theories Scale adapted from Douglas and Sutton (2011). There were 
seven statements (e.g. “Governments are suppressing evidence of the existence of 
aliens”, 1= strongly disagree, 7= strongly agree). The Belief in Real-World 
Conspiracy Theories Scale was adapted to measure the perceived beliefs of the 
in/out groups (“Now think about the group you previously stated that you feel close to 
and identify with. Please indicate how much you think the majority of [chosen in-
group, or prescribed in-group or out-group] agree with each statement below”). 
Level of identification with each of the social groups (in-group, out-group and 
other university students) was measured using the Inclusion of Other in the Self 
scale (Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 1992; Tropp & Wright, 2001). This is a one-item scale 
where participants were presented with a series of seven Venn diagrams ranging 
from non-overlapping circles to almost fully over-lapping circles. Participants were 
asked to indicate which diagram best represents their level of identification with each 
group. The measure was scored on a scale ranging from one to seven, with one 
representing completely non over-lapping circles (i.e., very low identification) and 
seven representing nearly completely over-lapping circles (i.e., very high 
identification). Finally, Need for Uniqueness was measured using the four-item Self-
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Attributed Need for Uniqueness (SANU) scale (Lynn & Snyder, 2002; e.g., “Being 
distinctive is important to me”, 1= not at all, 5= extremely). The measures were 
presented in a randomised order to each participant, followed by an online debrief. 
2.2 Results and Discussion 
Descriptive statistics and Pearson’s correlation coefficients are presented in 
Table 1. The effects of demographic variables on personal belief in conspiracy 
theories were tested. Sex differences were evident, with females having significantly 
higher belief in conspiracy theories (M = 3.38, SD = 1.35) than males (M = 2.51, SD 
= .97), t(109) = -2.32, p = .022, d = 0.66. There was no correlation between age and 
conspiracy belief (r = -.01, p = .939, n = 111).  
As shown in Table 1, personal conspiracy belief significantly and positively 
correlated with the perceived beliefs of the in-group, ‘typical’ university students and 
also the out-group in conspiracy theories. Need for Uniqueness did not significantly 
correlate with any variables. Level of social identification with each social group did 
not significantly correlate with any variables, except for the level of social 
identification with ‘typical’ university students which significantly negatively correlated 
with age, thus older participants reported lower social identification with other 
university students. 
A one-way repeated measures ANOVA was conducted between participants’ 
level of social identification with the in-group they chose, the out-group they chose 
and ‘typical’ university students. This was to check that participants have a higher 
level of social identification with the in-groups versus the out-group. As the 
assumption of sphericity was violated (p = .027), the Greenhouse-Geisser correction 
was used. There was a significant difference in level of social identification across 
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the three groups, F(1.88, 204. 74) = 253.83, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2   = .7, 𝜂𝐺
2  = .59  . Pairwise 
comparisons using Bonferroni corrections indicated that participants identified with 
their chosen in-group significantly more than the prescribed in-group (‘typical’ 
university students) (p < .001) and the out-group (p < .001), and they identified with 
‘typical’ university students significantly more than with the out-group (p < .001) (See 
Table 1 for means). Thus, the three groups successfully represented a proximal in-
group, a distal in-group and an out-group.  
A hierarchal multiple regression analysis was then conducted to test the role 
of the perceived norms of conspiracy belief (the perceived belief of the in-group, 
‘typical’ university students and the out-group) in predicting personal conspiracy 
beliefs. Personal conspiracy belief was entered as the dependent variable, with sex 
entered as the predictor variable in the first step of the regression. The model was 
significant, F(1, 109) = 5.38,  R²  =  .05,  p = .022, and accounted for 4.7% of variance 
in conspiracy belief. In the next step, the perceived conspiracy beliefs of the three 
groups were entered (see Table 2). The multi-collinearity of the model was checked, 
and no issues were detected (all tolerances >.59 and all VIFs <1.7). The overall 
regression model was significant, F(4, 106) = 53.32, R²  =  .67, p < .001, and 
accounted for 66.8% of the variance in personal conspiracy belief. As hypothesised, 
the perceived norms of conspiracy belief of the in-group positively predicted actual 
norms of conspiracy belief, as did the perceived norms of ‘typical’ university 
students. The perceived belief of the out-group in conspiracy theories did not 
significantly predict personal conspiracy belief. 
Investigating the second hypothesis, a paired samples t-test was conducted to 
compare participants’ actual conspiracy belief (M = 3.27, SD = 1.34) and their 
predictions of the belief of other students in conspiracy theories (M = 3.66, SD = 
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1.23) to assess for the presence of misperceptions of conspiracy belief norms. 
Participants estimated that others endorsed conspiracy beliefs significantly more 
than they personally did t(110) = -3.83, p < .001, Cohen’s dz = 0.36, demonstrating a 
self-other discrepancy.  
Moderation analysis was conducted using the PROCESS macro for SPSS 
(Hayes, 2017). Model 2 was used which allows for two moderators to be added to 
the model (W and Z), and thus the effect of X (predictor), W, Z, XW, and XZ on Y 
(outcome) can be calculated. Model 2 was run twice, once for each of the significant 
predictors of belief in conspiracy theories; i) the perceived belief of the in-group (X) 
and ii) the perceived belief of ‘typical’ university students (X). Both participants’ level 
of social identification with the group (W) and their Need for Uniqueness (Z) were 
added as moderator variables, whilst actual conspiracy beliefs was added as the 
dependent variable (Y). However, this analysis was non-significant for each of the 
predictor variables. The relationship between both the perceived belief of the in-
group and the perceived belief of ‘typical’ university students in conspiracy theories 
and personal belief is not dependent on level of social identification with the group 
(in-group, b = -.00, SE = .04, t(105) = -.12, p = .91, 95% CI = -.07, .07; ‘typical’ 
university students, b = .09, SE = .05, t(105) = 1.72, p = .09, 95% CI = -.01, .19) or 
the need to feel unique (in-group, b = .03, SE = .08, t(105) = .42, p = .67, 95% CI = -
.13, .19; ‘typical’ university students, b = .11, SE = .11, t(105) = .98, p= .33, 95% CI = 
-.11, .34). 
Study 1 provides the first evidence that the perceived norms of conspiracy 
beliefs of groups identified with are positively associated with actual belief in 
conspiracy theories. The findings show that this relationship is not significantly 
moderated by the extent to which participants identify with the in-group (both chosen 
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and prescribed) or their need to feel unique. Moreover, this study demonstrates that 
conspiracy belief is perceived to be more normative amongst university students 
than it is.  
 
3. Study 2 
 
This study aimed to replicate the findings of Study 1 in a non-student, British 
community sample. The importance of this is to demonstrate the relationship 
between perceived norms of conspiratorial beliefs and personal beliefs outside of a 
university setting, as it has been noted that research assessing the influence of 
perceived norms on behaviours is often confined to university settings (McAlaney, 
Bewick, & Hughes, 2011). Therefore, the hypotheses and materials used in Study 2 
mirrored those from Study 1; however, in this case, the prescribed in-group was 
‘Other British citizens’.  
3.1 Method 
3.1.1 Participants and Design 
This study was pre-registered with the Open Science Framework (OSF) 
(osf.io/4786a).Two hundred and five participants were recruited via Prolific, an online 
recruitment platform where volunteers can register for studies in return for small 
monetary rewards (£1.25 for this study). Screening criteria were applied via Prolific 
to ensure that all participants were British and had a high approval rating on the 
recruitment platform, meaning that they had a reputation for completing surveys 
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satisfactorily3. Similar to Study 1, the questionnaire included attention check items 
(e.g. ‘This statement is an attention check. Please select 4 for this statement’) and 
participants who failed an attention check (n = 19) and participants who failed to 
enter a sensical in-group and out-group (n = 9) were removed. The remaining 
participants (n = 177; 129 females, 48 males, M = 35.66 years, SD = 12.27) were 
included in the analysis. 
This study replicated the design of Study 1, where the outcome variable was 
participants’ belief in conspiracy theories and the predictor variables were the 
perceived conspiracy beliefs of an in-group (chosen by participants), an out-group 
(chosen by participants) and ‘other British citizens’ (the prescribed in-group). Need 
for Uniqueness and level of social identification with each of the groups were 
measured as moderator variables. Demographic variables, age and sex, were 
measured.  
3.1.2 Materials and Procedure  
Ethical approval was first gained from the relevant university ethics panel. 
Qualtrics was used to design and host the study, and participants gave their 
informed consent before taking part. First participants were asked to complete the 
demographic questions and then they were asked to state an in-group and out-group 
of their choice. Participants then completed the same measures as in Study 1, 
presented in a randomised order, followed by an online debrief. 
3.2 Results and Discussion 
 
3 The pre-registration stated that all participants would be British, however the approval rating criteria 
was not pre-registered.  
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Descriptive statistics and Pearson’s correlation coefficients are presented in 
Table 3. The effects of demographic variables on the personal belief in conspiracy 
theories was tested. Unlike in Study 1, no sex differences were present (females: M 
= 2.74, SD = 1.38; males: M = 2.71, SD = 1.36, t(175) = -.153, p = .879, d = .03). 
There was no significant correlation between age and conspiracy belief (r = -.11, p = 
.132, n = 177), so they were not controlled for in the analysis. Mirroring the 
correlations found in Study 1, personal conspiracy belief was significantly positively 
correlated with the perceived belief of the participants’ chosen in-group, the 
prescribed in-group (British citizens), and the out-group in conspiracy theories. Need 
for Uniqueness did not correlate significantly with any of the variables. There was a 
weak but significant negative correlation between the perceived belief of the out-
group in conspiracy theories and level of social identification with the out-group; 
suggesting that the less the participants identified with the out-group, the higher their 
estimations that the out-group endorsed conspiracy theories.  
A one-way repeated measures ANOVA was conducted between participants’ 
level of social identification with the in-group they chose, the out-group they chose 
and ‘Other British citizens’, to check that participants had a higher level of social 
identification with the in-groups versus the out-group. The assumption of sphericity 
was violated (p = .003), thus the Greenhouse-Geisser correction was used. There 
was a significant difference in level of social identification across the three groups, 
F(1.88, 330.98) = 305.53, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .63, 𝜂𝐺
2  = .51. Pairwise comparisons using 
Bonferroni adjustments indicated that the participants identified with their chosen in-
group significantly more than the prescribed in-group (‘Other British citizens’) (p < 
.001) and the out-group (p < .001), and they identified with ‘Other British citizens’ 
significantly more than with the out-group (p < .001) (See Table 3 for means). This 
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confirmed that the groups selected successfully represented a proximal in-group, a 
distal in-group, and an out-group.  
To test the first hypothesis, a multiple regression analysis was conducted. 
Personal conspiracy belief was entered as the dependent variable and the perceived 
conspiracy beliefs of the in-group, the ‘other British citizens’, and the perceived out-
group were entered as predictor variables (see Table 4). The multi-collinearity of the 
model was checked, and no issues were detected (all tolerances > .55 and all VIFs < 
1.8). The overall regression model was significant, F(3, 173) = 108.75, R2 = .65, p < 
.001, and accounted for 65.3% of the variance in conspiracy belief. As hypothesised, 
and mirroring the findings of Study 1, the perceived belief of the in-group in 
conspiracy theories significantly positively predicted participants’ personal belief in 
conspiracy theories and the perceived belief of the prescribed in-group, ‘other British 
citizens’, also significantly positively predicted conspiracy belief, but, as in Study 1, to 
a lesser extent. The perceived belief of the out-group did not significantly predict 
conspiracy belief.  
A paired samples t-test was conducted to compare participants’ actual 
conspiracy belief (M = 2.73, SD = 1.37) and their predictions of the belief of other 
British citizens (M = 3.22, SD = 1.11) to check for the presence of misperceptions of 
conspiracy belief amongst British citizens. Replicating the findings of Study 1, 
participants significantly over-estimated the conspiracy beliefs of others, t(176) = -
5.77, p < .001, Cohen’s dz = 0.43.  
Following the same procedure as Study 1, moderation analysis was 
conducted for each of the significant predictor variables; i) the perceived belief of the 
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in-group (see Figure 1)4 and ii) the perceived belief of ‘other British citizens’ (see 
Figure 2). Need for Uniqueness did not moderate the relationship between perceived 
belief of either in-group in conspiracy theories (chosen in-group, b = .04, SE = .06, 
t(171) = .73, p = .47, 95% CI = -.07, .16; ‘other British citizens’, b = -.02, SE = .10, 
t(171) = -.18, p = .86, 95% CI = -.21, .18) and personal belief. Level of social 
identification with the group did, however, significantly moderate the relationship 
between both perceived belief of the chosen in-group and perceived belief of ‘other 
British citizens’ with actual conspiracy beliefs (chosen in-group, b = .07, SE = .03, 
t(171) = 2.14, p = .03, 95% CI = .01, .14; ‘other British citizens’, b = .13, SE = .05, 
t(171) = 2.80, p = .01, 95% CI = .04, .21). The higher the level of social identification 
with each in-group, the stronger the relationship between the perceived 
conspiratorial beliefs of that group and personal conspiracy beliefs. However, the 
relationship between the perceived beliefs of both in-groups and personal conspiracy 
beliefs was significant for each level of social identification with the in-group (see 
Figures 1 and 2).  
Study 2 supports the findings from Study 1 demonstrating that perceived 
norms of an in-group’s conspiracy beliefs are positively associated with personal 
conspiracy belief. Further, as predicted, this relationship is moderated by 
participants’ level of social identification with the group for the general population 
sample in Study 2. Participants also overestimated the extent to which others 
endorse conspiracy theories, showing again that conspiracy belief is perceived to be 
more normative than it is.  
4. Study 3 
 
4 The moderation graphs (Figures 1-3) were made with the help of the templates provided here: 
http://www.jeremydawson.co.uk/slopes.htm 
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This study aimed to replicate the findings of Studies 1 and 2, but in the 
context of a specific conspiracy theory: anti-vaccine conspiracy theories. By focusing 
on anti-vaccine conspiracy theories, we were also able to examine how different 
types of in-groups and out-groups can impact beliefs in conspiracy theories. How we 
categorise ourselves or others depends much on the current context; individuals 
have several group memberships which impact beliefs and behaviours at different 
times (Oakes, 1987). Both the salience of a group and how meaningful a group is to 
a particular context have been shown to maximise the influence of the in-group 
(Oakes, 1987; Simon & Hastedt, 1999). Thus, the current study investigates the 
influence of i) ‘other parents’ and ii) ‘non-parents’, on personal anti-vaccine 
conspiracy beliefs, representing an in-group and out-group more relevant to the 
context (i.e., people who have made a decision about vaccinating children).  
However, we also examined others more broadly that represent national in-groups 
and out-groups, specifically iii) other British citizens, and iv) North Macedonian 
citizens. North Macedonia was chosen as the out-group to represent a national 
group which participants were unlikely to share a group membership and are also 
unlikely to have much knowledge about North Macedonian related conspiracy 
theories. We predicted that the perceived belief of both in-groups, other parents and 
other British citizens, would significantly positively predict personal belief in anti-
vaccine conspiracy theories, however this relationship would be stronger between 
the perceived belief of other parents and personal beliefs. It was predicted that the 
perceived beliefs of neither out-groups would be related to personal anti-vaccine 
conspiracy beliefs.  
4.1 Method 
4.1.1 Participants and Design 
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This study was pre-registered (osf.io/9q5kt). Participants were recruited using 
Prolific, in the same way as in Study 2. Screening criteria were applied via Prolific to 
ensure that all participants were British, were parents and had a high approval rating 
on the recruitment platform5. A sample of 200 participants was sought to increase 
the stability of correlations (Schönbrodt & Perugini, 2013). Thus, 217 British parents 
took part in the survey. Once data were cleaned, six respondents were removed as 
their surveys were incomplete and 14 respondents were removed as they failed to 
accurately complete an attention check (e.g. ‘Check ‘4’ for this statement’). A sample 
of 197 British parents was included in the analysis (135 females, 61 males, 1 
trans/other Mage = 42.42 years, SDage= 11.09). 
The design of the study was cross-sectional, where the outcome variable was 
the participants’ belief in anti-vaccine conspiracy theories. The predictor variables 
were the perceived beliefs of the Majority of Other Parents (an in-group anticipated 
to be salient and meaningful in this context), the Majority of Non-parents (an out-
group anticipated to be meaningful in this context), the Majority of Other British 
Citizens and the Majority of North Macedonian Citizens. Participants’ Need for 
Uniqueness and social identification with each of the groups were measured as 
moderator variables. Participants’ demographic characteristics (sex, age), and age of 
their youngest child were measured. Education level was also specifically measured 
as research has indicated that this can negatively predict conspiracy beliefs (e.g. van 
Prooijen, 2017). 
4.1.2 Materials and procedure  
 
5 The pre-registration form stated that all participants would be British parents, however the approval 
rating criteria was not pre-registered. 
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Ethical approval was first gained from the relevant university ethics panel and 
the study was hosted by Qualtrics. Once the study was accessed via Prolific, 
participants were first presented with an information page, followed by a consent 
form. First participants were asked to complete the demographic questions. Need for 
Uniqueness was measured in the same way as in Studies 1 and 2 (SANU scale; 
Lynn & Snyder, 2002). 
Personal belief in anti-vaccine conspiracy theories was measured using the 
Belief in Anti-Vaccine Conspiracy Theories Scale, adapted from Jolley and Douglas 
(2014b). There were 10 statements for participants to complete (e.g. 
“Misrepresentation of the efficacy of childhood vaccines is motivated by profit”, 1 = 
strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). Participants completed this scale a further 
four times, where it was adapted to measure the perceived beliefs of the in/out-
groups; Majority of Other Parents, Majority of Non-parents, Majority of Other British 
Citizens and Majority of North Macedonian Citizens. Level of social identification with 
each of the social groups was measured in the same way as in Studies 1 and 2, 
using the Inclusion of Other in the Self Scale (Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 1992; Tropp & 
Wright, 2001). The measures were presented in a randomised order to each 
participant, followed by an online debrief. 
4.3 Results and Discussion 
Descriptive statistics and Pearson’s correlation coefficients are presented in 
Table 5. The effects of demographic variables on personal belief in anti-vaccine 
conspiracy theories were tested. Sex differences were evident, with male 
participants having significantly higher belief in anti-vaccine conspiracy theories (M = 
3.00, SD = 1.42) than females (M = 2.56, SD = 1.14), z (196) = -2.02, p = .044. 
Education level was also significantly negatively associated with anti-vaccine 
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conspiracy beliefs, r = -.23, p = .001, n = 197; participants who had a higher level of 
education had a lower belief in anti-vaccine conspiracy theories. The age of the 
participants’ youngest child was also significantly associated with their anti-vaccine 
conspiracy beliefs, r = .17, p = .015, n = 197, such that participants with older 
children had a stronger belief in anti-vaccine conspiracy theories. Thus, participants’ 
sex, education level, and their children’s age were controlled for in the regression 
analyses. There was no correlation between the participants’ age and their anti-
vaccine conspiracy belief (r = .12, p = .092, n = 197).  
As shown in Table 5, personal anti-vaccine conspiracy belief was significantly 
positively correlated with the perceived belief of each of the groups. This indicates 
that the perceived beliefs of others in anti-vaccine conspiracy theories are 
significantly positively correlated with personal beliefs in anti-vaccine conspiracy 
theories, demonstrating the same pattern as general conspiracy theories shown in 
Studies 1 and 2. Need for Uniqueness was also significantly positively correlated 
with personal belief in anti-vaccine conspiracy theories.  
The level of identification with the in-groups (other parents and other British 
citizens) and out-groups (non-parents and North Macedonian citizens) were 
compared to ensure that participants identified more with the in-groups than the out-
groups. A one-way repeated measures ANOVA was conducted between 
participants’ level of social identification with other parents, non-parents, British 
citizens, and  North Macedonian citizens. The assumption of sphericity was violated 
(p < .001), thus the Greenhouse-Geisser correction was used. There was a 
significant difference in identification across the four groups; F(2.48, 486.85) = 
130.775, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .4, 𝜂𝐺
2  = .24 . Bonferroni analysis indicated that participants 
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identified significantly more with other parents (M = 4.76, SD = 1.73) than with non-
parents (M = 3.39, SD = 1.73), p < .001. Likewise, participants identified significantly 
more with other British citizens (M = 4.43, SD = 1.78) than with North Macedonian 
citizens (M = 2.23, SD = 1.77), p < .001. Participants also identified with other 
parents significantly more than they identified with other British citizens, p = .009 
A hierarchal multiple regression analysis was conducted to test the first 
hypothesis, that the perceived beliefs of other parents and other British citizens in 
anti-vaccine conspiracy theories positively predicts personal belief. Personal anti-
vaccine conspiracy belief was entered as the dependent variable. Then, sex, the age 
of participants’ youngest child and participants’ education level were entered as the 
predictor variables in the first step. The initial model was significant, F(3, 192) = 6.56,  
R²  =  .093,  p < .001, and accounted for 9.3% of variance in participants’ anti-vaccine 
conspiracy beliefs. In the next step, the perceived anti-vaccine conspiracy beliefs of 
the four groups were entered as predictor variables. The multi-collinearity of the 
model was checked, and no issues were detected (all tolerances > 0.47 and all VIFs 
< 2.12). The overall regression model was significant, F(7, 188) = 46.40, R²  =  .63, p 
< .001, and accounted for 63% of the variance in personal belief in anti-vaccine 
conspiracy theories (see Table 6).  
As hypothesised, the perceived beliefs of other parents in anti-vaccine 
conspiracy beliefs significantly positively predicted personal belief in anti-vaccine 
conspiracy theories. The perceived belief of those who were not parents did not 
significantly predict personal belief. Also, as predicted, the perceived belief of other 
British citizens predicted personal belief in anti-vaccine conspiracy theories, but to a 
lesser extent than the perceived belief of other parents. This supports our predictions 
that other parents are a meaningful in-group regarding anti-vaccine conspiracy 
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theories, where the perceived beliefs of this group are strongly positively associated 
with personal beliefs. The perceived belief of North Macedonian citizens also 
significantly predicted personal belief in anti-vaccine conspiracy theories.  
Moderation analysis was then conducted to test whether the relationship 
between the perceived belief of other parents in anti-vaccine conspiracy theories and 
personal belief was stronger for participants who highly identified with other parents, 
and/or participants who had a higher need to feel unique. Moderation analysis was 
conducted in the same way as Studies 1 and 2. Potential moderators, which were (1) 
participants’ Need for Uniqueness and (2) their level of social identification with other 
parents were added and all significant predictors in the hierarchical multiple 
regression above were included as covariates. The overall model was significant 
F(10,185) = 38.56, R2 = .68, p < .001, meaning that the new model predicted 68% of 
the variance in participants’ anti-vaccine conspiracy beliefs. Table 6 shows that both 
interaction terms were significant, along with significant main effects of the perceived 
beliefs of other parents, the perceived belief of the out-group (North Macedonian 
Citizens), education level and Need for Uniqueness. The addition of the interaction 
terms to the model significantly increased the variance in personal endorsement of 
anti-vaccine conspiracy theories explained, F(2,185) = 7.33, ΔR2 = .03, p = .001. 
However, this effect is small, with the addition of the interaction terms explaining only 
an extra 3% of the variance (see Figure 3).  
Investigating the second hypothesis, that participants over-estimate the extent 
to which other parents endorse anti-vaccine conspiracy theories, a one-way 
repeated measures ANOVA was conducted. The assumption of sphericity was 
violated and thus the Greenhouse-Geisser correction was used (p = .046). There 
was a significant difference between perceived belief of others in anti-vaccine 
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conspiracy theories and actual belief, F(1.94, 380.1) = 20.84, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2= .1, 𝜂𝐺
2= 
.02 .Bonferroni analysis indicated that participants significantly over-estimated the 
belief of both other parents (p < .001) and other British citizens (p < .001) in anti-
vaccine conspiracy theories. 
Perceived norms of anti-vaccine conspiracy beliefs of other parents is 
significantly positively associated with the actual anti-vaccine conspiracy beliefs of 
parents. The relationship between the perceived belief of other parents in anti-
vaccine conspiracy theories and personal belief is moderated by the extent to which 
participants identify with other parents, and participants’ need to feel unique; both 
heightened identification and need to feel unique strengthened this relationship. This 
study also demonstrated a self-other discrepancy, where parents estimated that 
other parents’ belief in anti-vaccine conspiracy theories was higher than their own. 
Thus, across the three studies, the perceived belief of in-groups in conspiracy 
theories has been shown to be significantly, positively associated with personal 
beliefs.  
5. General Discussion 
5.1 The Present Findings  
The current research supports the hypothesis that there is a positive 
relationship between perceived norms of in-group conspiracy belief and personal 
belief in conspiracy theories. This effect was found across both a student and 
community sample (when looking at general conspiracy belief) and in a parent 
sample (when focussing on anti-vaccine conspiracy beliefs). This is the first evidence 
of the relationship between the perceived norms of in-group conspiracy beliefs and 
personal conspiracy belief, where this relationship holds true for both the in-group 
chosen by participants, an in-group related to the context (other parents) and, to a 
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lesser extent, a more generic in-group (students, British Citizens). These studies 
strongly demonstrate that if people perceive that those with whom they share a 
group membership with endorse conspiracy theories, then they themselves will be 
more likely to endorse conspiracy theories. The analysis did not yield a significant 
association between the perceived belief of out-groups in conspiracy theories and 
personal belief.  
Further, in Studies 1 and 2 the relationship between perceived in-group belief 
and personal conspiracy belief was not influenced by participants’ need to feel 
unique although in Study 3, contrary to predictions, participants’ Need for 
Uniqueness slightly strengthened this relationship. These findings are important, as 
previous research shows that a stronger need to feel unique can buffer against 
social influence pressures (Imhoff & Erb, 2009). However, in Studies 1 and 2, a 
stronger Need for Uniqueness didn’t impact the association with social influence and 
in Study 3, Need for Uniqueness actually strengthened the effect of social influence. 
This may be because Need for Uniqueness has been shown to positively predict 
conspiracy belief (Imhoff & Lamberty, 2017; Lantian et al, 2017) and thus in Study 3, 
heightened Need for Uniqueness positively predicted personal anti-vaccine 
conspiracy belief and the perceived belief of other British Citizens. 
The next moderator tested was the level of identification with the in-group. 
Indeed, Social Identity Theory (SIT) stresses the importance of using the group as a 
guide for personal beliefs and behaviours (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner, 1982; 
1991) and that this is accentuated when one more strongly identifies with the group 
(Terry & Hogg, 1996). Thus, it was predicted that the relationship between perceived 
norms of the in-group regarding conspiracy belief and personal conspiracy belief 
would be strengthened for those who strongly identified with the in-group. In Studies 
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2 and 3, level of social identification with the group was a moderator, such that, the 
more participants identified with the in-group, the stronger the relationship between 
the perceived norms of that group and personal conspiracy belief, consistent with our 
hypothesis. However, this relationship was not signficant in Study 1. This could be 
because, in Study 1, the participants’ student identity was already salient (Hogg & 
Turner, 1987), as they were completing the study in exchange for course credits, and 
thus they saw themselves as a ‘student’ meaning they were influenced by the norms 
of this group without necessarily documenting higher identification with this group. It 
is also worth noting that even in Studies 2 and 3, the relationship between perceived 
beliefs of the in-groups and personal conspiracy beliefs was strong at each level of 
social identification with the group. Thus, the perceived belief of the in-group in 
conspiracy theories is still associated with personal belief even for those who don’t 
necessarily strongly identify with the in-group.  
The originality of the findings from the three studies presented here is 
demonstrated firstly in their contribution to our knowledge of the antecedents of 
conspiracy belief. Previous research has demonstrated that personality factors, such 
as narcissism, Machiavellianism, and subclinical paranoid and schizotypal 
personality traits (Barron et al., 2018; Darwin et al., 2011; Douglas & Sutton, 2011; 
March & Springer, 2019;), and psychological processes, such as distrust in authority, 
higher political cynicism, and lower self-esteem (see Douglas, Sutton & Cichocka, 
2017 for a review) are predictive of conspiracy belief. Similarly, Chayinska and 
Minescu (2018) and Mashuri and Zaduquisti (2014) have demonstrated that there 
are social identity mechanisms at play within intergroup conspiracy theories. In an 
intergroup context with situational threat, a greater level of social identification with 
an in-group can influence endorsement of specific conspiracy theories targeted 
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against the out-group. However, strong identification with the in-group does not 
always increase endorsement of conspiracy theories. Previous research has shown 
that defensive in-group identification, specifically, collective narcissism (and not 
secure identification with the in-group), is predictive of conspiracy beliefs against the 
out-group (Cichocka et al., 2015; Cichocka et al., 2015; Marchlewska, et al., 2019). 
The current studies uniquely extend our knowledge of the role of social influence 
mechanisms in conspiracy belief, demonstrating that the perceived norms of in-
groups’ conspiracy beliefs are strongly associated with general conspiracy theory 
endorsement in both a student and British community sample and with specific, 
harmful conspiracy theories. And further, that strong identification with the in-group 
can amplify this relationship.  
The findings also uniquely reveal that people have misperceptions about other 
people’s belief in conspiracy theories, estimating that others endorse them more 
than they do. Conspiracy theories are alternative viewpoints, which go against more 
mainstream accounts (Goertzel, 1994) and are generally considered a minority 
viewpoint (Lantian et al., 2017). However, conspiracy theories are gaining traction 
via the internet (Howell, 2013), specifically social media, and are often reported in 
mainstream news (e.g. Jolley & Patterson, 2020; Smith & Novella, 2007). The 
current findings suggest that belief in conspiracy theories and belief in anti-vaccine 
conspiracy theories specifically are considered to be more normative than they 
actually are. This is important because if the conspiracy belief of in-groups is over-
estimated, this could elicit unwarranted social pressure to also endorse conspiracy 
beliefs. Considering the negative social and health consequences of harbouring 
conspiracy beliefs (Jolley & Douglas, 2014a; Jolley & Douglas 2014b; Jolley et al., 
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2019, Thorburn & Bogart, 2005), specifically anti-vaccine conspiracy theories, it is 
concerning that perceived social norms could be driving conspiracy belief.  
Studies 1 and 2 did not support previous findings with regards to the 
relationship between Need for Uniqueness and belief in conspiracy theories (Imhoff 
& Lamberty, 2017; Lantian et al, 2017). Previous research has demonstrated that 
conspiracy belief is positively predicted by one’s need to feel unique, however, no 
such relationship was found in Studies 1 or 2. This could be indicative of cultural 
differences with regards to Need for Uniqueness in the UK compared to other 
European countries and the US where this relationship has previously been 
evidenced (Imhoff & Lamberty, 2017; Lantian et al, 2017). Further research could 
explore these potential cultural nuances in the relationship between Need for 
Uniqueness and Conspiracy belief.  
4.2 Limitations and Future Research  
One limitation of the current research is that it is correlational, where we have 
identified a relationship between the perceived conspiracy belief of others identified 
with and personal belief in conspiracy theories, but the causal direction is not yet 
established. As social norms provide an expectation about appropriate social 
behaviour (Sherif, 1936; Cialdini & Trost, 1998), and as such, have continually been 
shown influence personal attitudes and behaviour (Asch, 1954; Cialdini, Kallgren & 
Reno, 1991; Sherif, 1936), it is plausible that perceived social norms of conspiracy 
beliefs influence personal belief in conspiracy theories. For example, previous 
research has shown that perceived social norms can predict a wide range of 
behaviours; college student drinking (e.g. Bosari & Carey, 2001); smoking (e.g. 
Piscke et al., 2015); eating habits (e.g. Lally et al., 2010; Perkins et al., 2010, 2018), 
CONSPIRACY THEORIES AND BELIEF OF THE IN-GROUP 
 
gambling (e.g. Larimer & Neighbors, 2003; Meisel & Goodie, 2014) and sun 
protection (e.g Reid & Aiken, 2013). Thus, the current research extends this notion 
demonstrating the association between perceived social norms of in-group 
conspiracy belief and personal beliefs.  
Social norms perceptions can also have a reciprocal relationship with 
behaviour. Perceived social norms could influence personal attitudes and 
behaviours, and/or personal attitudes and behaviours can be projected onto others 
to estimate social norms (i.e., social projection). Future research should consider 
employing longitudinal and/or experimental designs to unpick the cause and effect 
relationship between social norms perceptions and personal beliefs in conspiracy 
theories. However, given the potential dangers of endorsing conspiracy theories 
demonstrated in the literature (see Douglas, Sutton, Jolley & Wood, 2015) an 
experimental manipulation aiming to increase belief in them could be harmful. On the 
one hand, it could be argued that a reciprocal relationship between perceived social 
norms of conspiracy beliefs and personal beliefs could reinforce one another such 
that; research has demonstrated that social projection plays an important role in 
shaping social norm perceptions and the subsequent acceptance of these perceived 
social norms reinforces the continuation of that belief or behaviour (Cho, Chung & 
Filippova, 2015; Neighbors et al., 2006). In the context of college student alcohol 
consumption, the effect of perceived norms on behaviour appears to be greater than 
the effect of personal behaviours on perceived norms (Neighbors et al., 2006). 
Moreover, the relationship between perceived norms of in-group conspiracy beliefs 
and personal beliefs was found across three different samples which indicates that 
the relationship is robust. 
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A second limitation of this research is that participants self-reported their level 
of conspiratorial belief using ‘The Belief in Real-World Conspiracy Theory Scale’ 
(Douglas & Sutton, 2011) in Studies 1 and 2, and the Belief in Anti-Vaccine 
Conspiracy Theories Scale, adapted from Jolley and Douglas (2014b) in Study 3, 
and as such, how participants infer the scales is not clear-cut. These scales have 
been used previously in conspiracy theory research and have shown good reliability 
(Douglas, Sutton, Callan, Dawtry, & Harvey, 2016; Jolley & Douglas, 2014b; 2017). 
Although, some research has shown that endorsing conspiracy theories can be 
viewed as a source of social stigma and thus participants may be less willing to 
divulge their conspiracy beliefs (Lantian, Muller, Nurra, Klein, Berjot & Pantazi, 
2018), this potential limitation was minimised as the survey was completed online 
meaning participants disclosed their beliefs privately.  
 The key findings of this research support the proposition that interventions 
challenging misperceived norms could be effective in reducing conspiracy beliefs in 
the future, which has not been attempted before. The current studies have provided 
evidence for the two key tenants of the Social Norms Approach (SNA; Dempsey, 
McAlaney & Bewick, 2018; McAlaney et al., 2011). The SNA begins with the premise 
that individuals are influenced by the beliefs and behaviours of others and often 
make misperceptions about how much others engage in certain behaviours. These 
misperceptions influence personal engagement in that behaviour (Perkins & 
Berkowitz, 1986). The SNA works by challenging these misperceptions of the belief 
and behaviours of others and thus reducing the social pressure to engage in a 
problem behaviour (Dempsey et al., 2018). Often used to reduce excessive drinking 
amongst college students (LaBrie et al., 2008; Neighbors et al., 2004; Walters et al., 
2000), this approach is now gaining traction in other areas, for  
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example, promoting energy conservation (Anderson et al., 2017) and reducing 
problematic gambling behaviours (Larimer & Neighbors, 2003). This 
could potentially be extended to reduce harmful conspiracy beliefs as the current 
study has demonstrated that i) there is a relationship between perceived conspiracy 
beliefs of others identified with and personal conspiracy beliefs and ii) participants 
over-estimate the extent to which others endorse conspiracy beliefs.  
This is important, as research to date suggests that conspiracy beliefs are 
associated with potentially harmful consequences, for example, anti-vaccine 
conspiracy beliefs can directly reduce intentions to vaccinate (Jolley & Douglas, 
2014b). Jolley and Douglas (2017) have addressed anti-vaccine conspiracy using an 
inoculation technique. They demonstrated that exposure to anti-conspiracy 
arguments prior to exposure to anti-vaccine conspiracy theories could inoculate 
people against the potentially harmful effects of anti-vaccine conspiracy theories. 
However, this intervention was not successful when the anti-conspiracy arguments 
were presented after the anti-vaccine conspiracy theories; demonstrating that once 
these beliefs are established, they can be difficult to correct, limiting the success of 
this approach (Jolley & Douglas, 2017). Therefore, these findings provide the 
foundations for developing interventions like the SNA, challenging misperceived 
norms and providing new avenues to reduce conspiracy beliefs in the future. 
Conclusion 
In summary, across three studies, the current research demonstrates that the 
perceived belief of in-groups in conspiracy theories are strongly, positively 
associated with personal conspiracy belief. Further, the current research shows that 
people over-estimate the extent of conspiracy belief amongst their in-groups. This is 
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important as it is the first study to directly link the perceived norms of in-groups to 
personal conspiracy belief and demonstrate that conspiracy beliefs of others are 
over-estimated. A challenge for researchers now is to determine the utility of 
information-based interventions which challenge such normative misperceptions of 
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Table 1 
Means, standard deviations, Cronbach’s alpha, and Pearson correlation matrix (Study 1). 
 Mean SD α 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Personal  
conspiracy belief 
3.27 1.34 .82  .78** .66** .22* -.04 -.01 -.10 .08 -.01 
2. Perceived belief of 
in-group in CT 
3.27 1.43 .88   .56** .15 -.03 .04 -.06 .09 -.05 
3.Perceived belief of 
‘Typical’ students in 
CT 
3.66 1.23 .86    .30** -.03 .13 -.05 -.01 -.04 
4. Perceived belief of 
out-group in CT 
3.76 1.58 .89     .03 .11 -.16 -.02 -.09 
5. Need for 
uniqueness 
2.65 0.77 .78      -.14 .08 .11 -.01 
6. Age (years) 23.32 7.81 -       .02 -.20* -.02 
7. In-group 
identification 
5.30 1.54 -        .11 .03 
8. ‘Typical’ student 
identification 
3.75 1.42 -         .13 
9. Out-group 
identification 
1.48 0.92 -          
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Table 2 
Results of the hierarchical multiple regression model predicting personal conspiracy belief (Study 1). 
Step Predictor B SE B β t CI (95%) 
1 Sex .87 .38 .22 2.32* .13, 1.62 
       
2 Sex -.12 .24 -.03 -0.52 -.60, .35 
 
Perceived belief of in-
group in CT 
.57 .07 .61 8.36** .44, .71 
 
Perceived belief of 
‘Typical’ students in CT 
.31 .08 .29 4.99** .16, .47 
 
Perceived belief of out-
group in CT 
.04 .05 .05 0.77 -.06, .14 
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Table 3 
Means, standard deviations, Cronbach’s alpha, and Pearson correlation matrix (Study 2). 





2.73 1.37 .85  .79** .60** .26** .09 -.11 -.01 .07 .01 
2. Perceived 
belief of in-
group in CT 





citizens in CT 
3.22 1.11 .84    .42** .02 -.09 -.01 -.12 -.10 
4. Perceived 
belief of out-
group in CT 
3.49 1.44 .88     .04 -.04 .01 .00 -.16* 
5. Need for 
uniqueness 
2.56 0.81 .88      -.11 .00 -.12 -.08 
6. Age 
(years) 
35.66 12.27 -       -.03 .04 -.01 
7. In-group 
identification 




3.79 1.50 -         .09 
9. Out-group 
identification 
1.69 1.22 -          
n = 177   *p < .05, ** p < .01. 
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Table 4 
Results of the multiple regression model predicting personal conspiracy belief (Study 2). 
Predictor B SE B β t CI (95%) 
Perceived belief of 
in-group in CT 
.72 .06 .68 12.14** .61, .84 
Perceived belief of 
‘Typical’ British 
citizens in CT 
.21 .07 .17 2.87** .07, .36 
Perceived belief of 
out-group in CT 
.03 .05 .03 0.66 -.06, .12 
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Table 5  
Means, standard deviations, Cronbach’s alpha, and Pearson correlation matrix (Study 3). 
 Mean SD α 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1. Personal anti-
vaccine CT belief 
2.69 1.24 .93  .74** .44** .62** .46** .24** .12 -.23** -.02 -.03 -.07 .15* 
2. Perceived 
belief of other 
parents in anti-
vaccine CTs 
3.07 1.22 .93   .45** .67** .35** .14 .19** -.16* -.11 -.06 -.05 .07 
3.Perceived belief 
of non-parents in 
anti-vaccine CTs 
3.07 1.28 .94    .51** .36** .19** .20** -.09 -.05 -.10 -.14* .01 
4. Perceived 
belief of other 
British citizens in 
anti-vaccine CTs 
3.08 1.12 .92     .42** .20** .08 -.18* -.11 -.12 -.13 .03 
5. Perceived 




3.50 1.16 .93      .10 -.01 -.06 .02 -.07 .03 .06 
6. Need for 
uniqueness 
2.41 0.86 .88       -.08 .14* .02 .01 -.17* .03 
7. Age (years)   -        -.14* -.03 .08 .04 -.06 
8. Education            .07 .08 -.01 .05 
9. Identification 
with parents 
4.76 1.73 -          .43** .65** .11 
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N = 197.  *p < .05.  **p < .01
10. Identification 
with non-parents 









2.23 1.77 -             
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Table 6 Results of the hierarchical multiple regression model predicting personal belief in anti-vaccine conspiracy theories. 
Step Predictor B SE B β t CI (95%) 
1 Sex -.43 .18 -.16 -2.36* -.79, -.07 
 Education level -.17 .06 -.20 -2.78** -.29, -.05 
 Age of youngest 
child 
.01 .01 .12 1.66 -.00, .03 
       
2 Sex -.25 .12 -.09 -2.09* -.4.8, -.01 
 Education level -.08 .04 -.10 -2.03* -.16, -.00 
 Age of youngest 
child 
.00 .01 .03 0.60 -.01, .01 
 Perceived belief 
of other parents 
in anti-vaccine 
CTs 
.54 .06 .53 8.67** .42, .67 
 Perceived belief 
of non-parents in 
anti-vaccine CTs 
.03 .05 .04 0.65 -.07, .14 
 Perceived belief 
of other British 
citizens in anti-
vaccine CTs 
.16 .07 .15 2.27* .02, .30 





.21 .05 .20 3.99** .11, .32 
*p<.05.  **p<.01. 
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Table 7 
Moderation analysis predicting personal belief in anti-vaccine conspiracy theories. 
Predictor B SE B t CI (95%) 
Sex -.14 .12 -1.24 -.37, .08 
Education level -.12 .04 -3.14** -.20, -.05 
Age of youngest child 
 
.01 .01 1.18 -.00, .02 
Perceived belief of Other British 
citizens in anti-vaccine CTs 
 
.12 .07 1.86 -.01, .26 
Perceived belief of North 
Macedonian citizens in anti-
vaccine CTs 
 
.22 .05 2.49** .12, .32 
Perceived belief of other parents in 
anti-vaccine CTs 
.55 .06 9.30** .43, .67 
Need for uniqueness .16 .07 2.39* .03, .29 
Social identification with other 
parents 
.04 .03 1.16 -.03, .10 
Perceived belief of other parents in 
anti-vaccine CTs * Need for 
uniqueness 
.14 .05 2.96** .05, .24 
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Perceived belief of other parents in 
anti-vaccine CTs * Social 
identification with other parents 
.05 .02 2.11* .00, .10 
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Figure 1. Moderation effect of level of identification with the in-group on the positive association of perceived belief of the in-group in 
conspiracy theories and personal belief in conspiracy theories in Study 2 (Model 2 of PROCESS macro; N = 177). Error bars display the 
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Figure 2. Moderation effect of level of identification with other British citizens on the positive association of perceived belief of other British 
citizens in conspiracy theories and personal belief in conspiracy theories in Study 2 (Model 2 of PROCESS macro; N = 177). Error bars display 
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Figure 3.  Moderation effect of level of identification with other parents and Need for Uniqueness on the positive association of perceived belief 
of other parents in anti-vaccine conspiracy theories and personal belief in anti-vaccine conspiracy theories in Study 3 (Model 2 of PROCESS 
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